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Using Cameroon as a case study, this research examines if a legal system built primarily upon
indigenous laws can serve modern economic, political, and social realities. Indigenous laws have
several attractive advantages (such as expediency in dispute resolution, and fostering community
cohesiveness), and may fully thrive in a homogenous society. However, after examining the realities in
Cameroon, the study concludes that since the society has dozens of tribes with values and traditions
which are invariably different, and because the country relies on foreign aid, what is advocated is a
system whereby indigenous and formal laws co-exist.
Key words: Indigenous, laws, formal, Cameroon, political, economic, social realities.

INTRODUCTION
Many studies on informal social control have harped on
the relative decorum and limited interpersonal conflicts in
local settings in developing countries in comparison to
the plethora of cases taken to formal courts in big cities
(Time, 2000; Austin, 1987). Explanations for this
perceived phenomenon have been given to include
adherence and abidance to traditional mores
(Okereafoezeke, 2002; Time, 2000; Austin 1995),
informal restraints on criminality such as family (Time,
2000; Austin, 1995, 1987), community cooperation and
ostracism (Austin, 1984). More current research tends to
focus on the settlement process used by local
communities. This process is characterized by prompt
response to the dispute, use of a neutral and perceptive
mediator, and resolution by indemnification or restitution,
and reconciliation. Restorative justice, as this process
has come to be known is geared towards maintaining
community cohesiveness and restoring the aggrieved
party close to the position where he/she was prior to the
dispute. These beneficial aspects of restorative justice
are victim-centered and as proponents of restorative
justice suggest litigants proclaim above average
satisfaction with the process (Sherman and Strang,
2007). Such satisfaction is credited to the face-to- face
confrontation between victim and offender (Green, 2007),
sensible and therapeutic benefits (Daly and Stubbs,
2006), and purgative effects that promote closure

(Johnstone, 2002).
Statement of the problem
Even though restorative justice seems attractive, formal
courts are scattered throughout the big towns and cities
in developing countries. Justice in formal courts is
notoriously slow, expensive, and often dwells on
stigmatizing the guilty person by creating a permanent
criminal judicial record, and hardly opens up the
possibility for reconciliation. Braithwaite (2005) has
argued that formal criminal justice promotes an
adversarial process over a communicative process, and
that the looming existence of punishments stalls the
effectiveness of formal judicial processes. Its drawbacks
notwithstanding, formal courts have invariably handled
matters beyond inter-personal relations, as for instance,
political issues, corporate disputes, and other issues
unique to modernization. These types of noninterpersonal
cases
were
not
envisioned
in
customary/traditional law, and as some have contended,
even contemporary legislators have not been able to
foreshadow the myriad of crimes which time may unleash
(Samaha, 2008, Hart and Sacks, 1994). Giving that
strengths and downsides have been raised in both
formats, Austin (1987), observed that in Philippines at the
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barangay (community of towns and villages) level a blend
of informal and formal dispute resolution is evident.
Using Cameroon as a case study, this paper seeks to
examine if viable legal systems primarily built upon
indigenous law and indigenous legal and quasi-legal
notions could have developed in Africa with the potential
of serving modern economic, political, and social reality.
A former British and French colony, Cameroon became
independent in 1961. Prior to becoming a League of
Nations mandate, and subsequently a United Nations
trustee under the British and French, Cameroon was a
German protectorate. Following its colonial history
Cameroon inherited a pluralistic system of laws which
remain applicable in the country despite the existence of
Cameroonian customary law which preceded those
transplanted laws. Since independence, modern
(transplanted) laws have consistently replaced or
eclipsed traditional laws in most African countries
including Cameroon (Okafo, 2009; Okereafoezeke, 2002;
Time, 2000). While village settings tend to adhere to
traditional laws, the future of traditional law in light of
treatment by the received laws in big towns and cities is
increasingly questionable. Several factors account for this
trend including the lack of progress in village settings as
opposed to the visible technological and commercial
advancements in the bigger settings, heterogeneity in the
bigger locales, plurality of dialects and languages in the
towns and cities as well as constant transiency. Giving
these factors this study examines if traditional laws can
address the ever changing and complex transactions and
incidences that are prevalent in both domestic and
international dealings. This paper finds relevance in that it
focuses the debate on a country with pluralistic formal
laws, and a dual official language, as well as a multitude
of traditional laws, and multitudes of dialects.
SETTING AND PROCEDURE
This study was conducted in Cameroon. Several methodological
techniques were employed. Following years of living in the country
and several subsequent visits, numerous discussions were held
with legal scholars, judges and barristers. As well, local village
chiefs were engaged in discussions and the case notes of one of
them were reviewed. The penal code and other treatises were
scrutinized. Further, sitting in, and observing which cases were
processed in court and how the cases were disposed of further
enlightened the research.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CAMEROON IN BOTH
INFORMAL AND FORMAL JUDICIAL SETTINGS
Just as inadequacies are obvious with formal systems of
justice, so are inadequacies evident in indigenous
systems of law. The Indigenous system of dispute
resolution is characterized by an older male (usually the
chief) in the community together with a few chosen
elderly men who form a panel (seldom are women

involved) who rely on community mores and “wisdom” to
persuade the litigants to set aside their differences. Even
when women are included in the panel, their numbers are
disproportionately small. In the Mwaku village of the
Bakossi tribe in Cameroon for instance, the panel or
traditional council comprises eighteen people, ten men,
four women and four youths, and they meet every
Sunday with the chief presiding over every deliberation
(Time, 2000). The process of dispute resolution entails
mediation with the intent of implementing a solutionbased outcome while still maintaining community
harmony particularly since the litigants by and large do
remain in the same community.
As the only method of dispute resolution in
Cameroonian villages and small towns, indigenous law is
applied in all types of disputes including breach of
contracts, matrimonial issues, land and tenancy disputes,
property crimes, and assault and battery. Sanctions
imposed by the chief and his panel include reprimands,
giving livestock, palm wine, agricultural products, and
even banishment. Litigants who are dissatisfied with
outcomes in traditional forums of dispute resolutions have
to take their cases to formal courts in big towns or cities
where there will be trials de novo.
Towns have customary courts and these courts are
presided over by “notables” (Time, 2000). Notables are
ordinary citizens without any formal legal training who are
presumed to be astute in folkways. They decide
matrimonial cases, land and property disputes but defer
child custody issues and alimony to high courts.
Two formal systems of law exist in Cameroon due to
the colonial heritage. Anglophone Cameroon has applied
English law since colonization, and has continued to do
so following a 1955 Magistrate Court Law. Section 11 of
the 1955 law states:
Subject to the provision of any written law and in
particular of this section and of section 10, 15, and 33 of
this law, the common law the doctrines of equity, the
statutes of general application which were in force in
English on the first day of January 1900, shall in so far as
they relate to any matter with respect to which the
legislator of southern Cameroon is for the time being
competent to make laws be in force within the jurisdiction
of the court.
Francophone Cameroon (8 out of ten regions/states in
the country are French speaking) applies French law
(code penal, code civil). Article 46 of legislation prevalent
in what was Federal Republic of Cameroon stressed the
need for the inherited laws to be retained as long as they
did not conflict with the constitution. Section 38 of the
constitution of 1972 reinforced and added gravitas to
Article 46 by stating:
The legislation resulting from the laws and regulations
applicable in the federal state of Cameroon and in the
federated states on the date of entry into force in all of
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their provisions which are not contrary to the stipulations
of this constitution shall remain in force, for as long as it
is not amended by legislative or regulatory process
(Constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon, 1972:
22). Formal courts, which include courts of first instance,
high courts, appeal courts, and the Supreme Court, apply
formal justice.
Could indigenous/traditional laws serve modern
economic, political, and social realities?
Cruz (2007: 3) notes that the terms “customary law,
common law, indigenous law, tribal law, tradition, custom,
norm, and primitive law” are used interchangeably to
“refer to the law of indigenous peoples.” These customary
laws are unwritten customs and mores passed down
through oral tradition (Asiedu-Akrofi, 1989). Formal law in
the context of African nations is usually Western law
adopted by the various former colonies.
Even though formal law has certain values and
doctrines that are not evident in indigenous practices, as
for instance, having set lex scripta of criminal procedure
and evidence, established rule of law, and set laws/codes
that regulate everyday transactions, and established
ways of enforcements, a good number of local people still
prefer traditional practices (Brillion, 1983; Austin, 1994,
1995; Thompson, 1996; Time, 2000, 2011 (forthcoming);
Okafo, 2009). This preference stems in part from apathy
toward agents of the justice system, excessive delays in
disposing cases, and over punitiveness of the justice
system. Further, preference for indigenous law may also
be due to autochthonous people preferring “their own
value system” (Cruz, 2007: 2).
In Cameroon, there is no single customary practice.
Each tribe has its own values and traditions which are
invariably quite different. Because there are over a
hundred tribes, and dialects, uniformity in practice is
sometimes not obtainable. However, there is seldom
tension in applying a custom since assessors from the
tribes of each litigant are always present when there is a
dispute. Assessors interpret traditional practices, and
when they are absent during a trial, any verdict rendered
is null. For the most part, since everyday transactions
and reasons for litigation in traditional settings mirror
what goes on in the cities and in advanced countries, the
efficacy of addressing these social and political realities
cannot be challenged as long as the process reflects the
practices and values of the society. Traditions and
customs are not entirely static, like every process,
customs adapt to contemporary occurrences. A jury in a
western system of law decides a case using common
sense while applying the law that governs the case. In
like fashion, decisions of traditional rulers, notables and
assessors are shaped by common sense and the
applicable traditional value.
With regard to breach of contractual obligations,
modern courts in Cameroon apply the lex fori (law of the
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venue of the court) instead of the lex loci (law of the place
where the contract was drawn). In essence, the place
where the plaintiff files a law suit has jurisdiction of a
case (Time, 2000). This is the case with indigenous
practices as well, but by securing assessors from the
various tribes of the litigants, indigenous methods of
dispute resolution attempt to ensure equity by taking into
consideration how each litigant perceived the contract.
Most disputes everywhere arise because there is a
breach of a contractual obligation of some sort, be it
failure to perform a minor duty, or a failure to respect a
more intricate obligation as for instance, an international
treaty, trans-national trade agreement, or some private
right and obligation. Malinowski (1926), who is one of the
pioneers in this debate, opines that both traditional and
formal law strive for the same goal, and that is to address
both the economic and social issues that arise between
or among people. Consequently, even when approaches
are different, the intent is similar. Decades later
Gluckman (1955) noted that regardless of the locale,
judges will enact similar laws to address similar issues.
Giving that traditional councils play the functional roles of
legislative, executive, and judiciary, it is not beyond their
capacity to figure out how to address a novel issue.
The argument could be made that it is easier to abide
by formal law since its mandate is clearly written and
published, unlike traditional law that requires that one
immerses oneself in the tradition to understand the
substantive and procedural aspects of the tradition. To
this Benson (1990: 12) asserts that “customary law is
recognized, not because it is backed by the power of
some strong individual or institution, but because each
individual recognizes the benefits of behaving with other
individuals‟ expectations—given that others also behave
as he expects”.
Criticism has been levied on how traditional law
addresses matrimonial issues (Time, 2000, 2012
(forthcoming) cited in Time, 2011; Bentheim, 2010;
Monekosso, 2001; Beswick, 2001; Erez and Thompson,
1996). Power imbalances in the composition of the tribal
council that decide cases (in the Bakossi tribe of
Cameroon as discussed earlier, there are ten men and
four women) in part accounts for the questionable, if not
unconscionable, treatment of women in traditional courts,
and not to be ignored, the rather backward mores and
practices that continuously subjugate women.
It is to be reckoned that schools are being opened in
even very remote villages of Cameroon. It is only through
education and self-empowerment that women get from
activist groups and non-governmental organizations that
change in how women are treated will be realized. In
Mexico for instance, women‟s organizations have
emerged with women advocating fairness and changes to
traditional practices that are coercive, yet insisting to
retain their traditional identities and values (Castillo,
2002). Some of their demands have included “economic,
political, physical, and socio-cultural autonomy” (Castillo,
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2002: 12). In Cameroon, even formal laws do not grant
women the same human rights as men. As Ngassa
(1999: 37) notes “…the law itself, lack of necessary laws
…inability to enforce already enacted laws, the ability of
society to assimilate and exploit new laws…” hamper
prospects of women in Cameroon from acquiring their
human rights.
Coercive treatment of women is not unique to
traditional law or to a developing society like Cameroon.
Belknap (2007); Bui (2007); Burford and Adams (2004);
Hotaling and Buzawa (2003), have documented how
battered women are rendered powerless in the U.S.
justice system, either by reducing their role in the judicial
process to a “passive” one, or by not providing them
adequate protection thereby compromising their safety. It
is for these reasons as van Wormer (2004); Gilligan
(1982), suggest that many western countries are turning
to informal methods to resolve matrimonial issues.
Informal methods here refer to a conferencing method,
but then for this to have integrity it should be gender
neutral.
Acquired or transplanted law reflects the values and
mores of the society from which the law is borrowed. The
value system of that society is inculcated into its citizens
from early on in life, and as Cruz (2007: 2) states, “an
indigenous nation‟s sovereignty is strengthened if its law
is based upon its own internalized values and norms.”
Transplanted law therefore does not re-enforce the
values of the receiving nation, consequently using that
law to regulate the behavior of people is anomalous. Law
addresses social situations that arise among persons of
that culture, or persons in that culture, and the fact that
the law may not be codified, or is not reflective of the
ideals of another society does not lessen its ability to
control the social processes of those under its sphere.
English and French are the national languages of
Cameroon, and just a small fraction of the population is
fluent in either, let alone both. The applicable laws in the
formal courts are borrowed in their entirety from England
and France, and only piecemeal attempts have been
made to promulgate laws that depart from the colonial
precepts (Time, 2000). Since there are as many dialects
in the country as there are tribes, whose dialect gets
precedence when there is a dispute is an obstacle that
cannot be ignored given that it is impossible to expect
anyone to know the hundreds of dialects in the country.
Should the indigenous laws be codified in English and
French? Cruz (2007) discussed this predicament in
relation to Pueblos. She reflectively states that “When a
tribe works its Indian tradition into any non-traditional
system, the outcome represents a mixture, not pure
tradition” (Cruz, 2007: 6). Formal courts are not free of
the language dilemma that occasionally crop up in
traditional settings. To use language/dialect barrier
therefore to cast doubt as to the ability of a country to use
its traditional ways to resolve disputes, be they those that
relate to modern economic, political, or social realities,

may be casting doubt as to the foundational principles of
customs.
Difficulties in using indigenous laws to serve modern
economic, social, and political realities
That traditional law can be adopted to handle
contemporary social, political, and economic realities is
not as easy as may appear. Cruz (2007: 8) lists a number
of pertinent questions that need to be properly addressed
if indigenous laws can be the law of the land. Among the
questions are:
… What traditional law are we talking about? … How is
traditional law organized? Are there some aspects of
traditional law that are inappropriate for discussion? How
should elders be selected? Who is an elder? In what
manner should meetings and interviews be conducted?
Who should be involved in the work and who should
make decisions regarding the interpretation of materials
gathered? Can the meaning of the law survive the
translation from the native language to written English?
Should it be translated or kept in the native language?
Who holds the law? Who is to say what traditional law
applies or translates to this modern time?
As Cruz acknowledges these are in fact very difficult
questions, and responses to them depend on several
factors including: the history of each tribe, the level of
assimilation of colonial influences, the influence of inter
tribal marriages, as well as how much of the dialects,
land, and folkways have been retained. Further, giving
that local chiefs, particularly those in many African states,
rule their tribes as dictatorships as their rulings are not
subject to challenges nor are there any mechanisms of
accountability or transparency, it is difficult to fathom the
extent to which indigenous laws can serve broad modern
interests.
In the context of Cameroon, having indigenous law as
law of the land and the law that applies in dealings with
other countries may be an uphill task. Currently, some
tribes (for example, Douala, Bamileke, Bassa, Ewondo,
Hausa, Bali, and a few others) are more than hundreds
more either in fact, or seemingly, more dominant and
strive for more national recognition as the pre-eminent
tribe. Should one tribal law be projected as the national
law if Cameroon ever considered dispensing with western
law there likely will be more putrefaction and more
dividedness. As a bi-jural country, strife is evident as
common law is increasingly being suppressed. Take the
CIMA CODE, for instance, a French acronym for
Conference InterAfricain de Marche d’assurance en
Abrege, which embodies laws that deal with insurance
issues, it completely ignores common law (Time, 2000).
As well, as a signatory to a 1996 treaty that blends civil
and commercial laws in sixteen Francophone African
countries, Cameroon projects only civil law and French,
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and completely disregards common law and English. If
Anglophone Cameroon is already crying foul and
contemplating seceding, it is hard to imagine the chaos
that will ensue if one tribe‟s laws were chosen as law of
the land.
As Pimentel (2010) notes, independence from colonial
rule comes with a price for most African nations. To be
part of the community of nations, and a member of the
United Nations, Pimentel (2010) observes that African
countries invariably have to conform to western law.
Further, he remarks that because African countries rely
on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other countries for their economic growth, they are almost
fated to embrace western systems of law especially since
these organizations and countries usually stipulate the
legal system that best projects their interests. Such also
is the case when western countries, in promoting human
rights and justice, define what justice is and stipulate the
process by which justice is attained.
Okafo (2009: 231) maintains that left to their own
devices Africans and indeed former colonies can
maintain indigenous laws that best serve their needs. He
states “colonization breeds criminalization. This is
because a colonizer needs coercive rules and
regulations, usually with excessive penalties attached, to
obtain compliance with the colonizer‟s policies, which
invariably are out-of-sync and thus unpopular among the
colonized.” The point is well taken except that if countries
like Cameroon have to continuously rely on foreign aid for
sustenance, and can never seem to be able to account
for the aid or loan money, then the donor or lender should
dictate a process of accountability even if it means
imposing their own system of justice (BBC surmised that
“tackling AIDS cannot happen until a cure is found for
Cameroon‟s second deadly virus—corruption” (Cuffe, J.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6198337.stm, retrieved
1/6/2007)). BBC proffered this statement after doubts
were raised as to whether Cameroon could account for
the $133 million (68 million pounds) given to help
HIV/AIDS patients. These doubts were raised given a
history of graft and extensive mismanagement of funds in
that country raised by Transparency International.

Conclusion
A country‟s heritage and identity are marked by the
values and norms with which it has evolved. After all, the
sovereignty of a nation and its tradition can only be
fortified if its laws are premised upon the values and
norms it adopted from its inception. When borrowed law
is made the dominant applicable law in a country, it
signals that the values of the lender country are also
imported. To legitimize and enforce such laws, the people
upon whom they are imposed must readily be receptive
of them otherwise a constant clash will ensue. That said,
there is nothing to suggest that the prevalence of
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indigenous laws per se leads to law abidance or to easy
law enforcement.
This discussion will have little significance if indigenous
laws were advocated just for those under its influence.
However, the thesis rests upon whether indigenous laws
can be used to address modern social, economic, and
political realities. Giving that many African nations
depend on the United Nations and other organizations for
intervention during crisis, and these organizations are
also restraining forces for human rights violations, there
is thus a limit to what indigenous laws can control.
Moreover, when a country constantly depends on others
for economic viability, that country accepts not only the
terms of the aid, but also the rule of law projected by the
donor to secure its interest. What is ultimately drawn
from this discussion and advocated is a process whereby
indigenous laws and formal laws coexist with each
delineating its role.
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